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The Disability Dilemma: Difficulties Involving ERISA
Claims for Subjective-Proof Diseases
Introduction
Imagine going to the doctor with an intense amount of pain. When he
shows you the pain scale, you point to the most scrunched up, sweating
face, indicating you’re feeling a ten on a ten-point scale. 1 Imagine that your
doctor tells you that you are not entitled to relief because he cannot
objectively measure how much pain you are feeling. He cannot objectively
find the cause of your pain, and so he cannot prescribe any medication that
might help you manage that pain. Though this scenario would not happen in
a doctor’s office, this process is how some disability plans treat employee
claims for benefits under employee benefit plans covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 2 Claimants want disability
benefits for diseases that doctors diagnose using subjective criteria, such as
patient reports of pain or interviews, but employers do not want to grant
these benefits because of the lack of objective proof of the disease.
Many claims for long-term disability benefits are denied, some because
the subjective evidence the claimant presented, even by way of a treating
physician, do not meet the criteria for which their plan provides. 3 Since
these claims are expensive to pay out, the employer may deny the claim
early on, banking on the fact that the claimant may not want to expend the
time and money to appeal the denial. 4 In an obvious disability case, such as
the result of a car accident, it may be easy to obtain disability benefits. If,
on the other hand, “there is any dispute regarding a diagnosis or impairment
and its disabling effects, the insurance company usually resolves that doubt

1. Wong-Baker FACES Pain Rating Scale, WONG-BAKER FACES FOUND.,
http://wongbakerfaces.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
2. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2012). “The terms ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ and ‘welfare plan’ mean any plan,
fund, or program which was . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries . . . disability . . . benefits . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
3. See, e.g., Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 88 (2d Cir. 2009); Billinger
v. Bell Atl., 240 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
4. See Loren M. Lambert, ERISA: License to Cheat, Lie, and Steal for the Disability
Insurance Industry, UTAH B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2008 at 14, 16 (“[A] reasonably sophisticated and
careful insurance company can summarily deny almost all appeals and immunize their
decision from reversal in federal district court.”).
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in its favor.”5 When a claim for disability is denied, it can be very difficult
for a claimant to appeal the decision. 6 A claimant must first file an
administrative appeal and exhaust his administrative remedies. 7 If the denial
is affirmed, then the claimant must find a lawyer and appeal to the proper
district court, creating an additional expense. Given the deferential standard
of review for ERISA denials, it is likely that a district court will uphold the
plan administrator’s decision.8
When plan administrators deny these claims, claimants may appeal the
denial to the federal court that has jurisdiction and venue over the claim. 9 In
most cases, the federal court will review the claim to determine if the plan
administrator abused its discretion in denying the claim for disability
benefits. 10 The abuse of discretion standard of review—used in most
appeals of denial of disability claims—provides that the administrative
denials of the claims are usually upheld. 11
Frequently, employees make benefits claims for disabilities that stem
from diseases that are diagnosed using subjective evidence. 12 Plan

5. Id.
6. See id. (“[U]nder ERISA, regardless of the merits of a disability claim, to prevail a
claimant must show that the insurance company’s decision was unreasonable, only
supported by more than a scintilla of evidence, or both.”).
7. See, e.g., Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th
Cir. 1997); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990); Amato v. Bernard, 618
F.2d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1980).
8. See Lambert, supra note 4, at 16.
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989); see also
Christopher R. Stevenson, Abusing Abuse of Discretion: Judicial Review of ERISA
Fiduciaries’ Discretionary Decisions in Denial of Benefits Cases, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 105, 106 (2009) (“Circuit courts erroneously imported the overly-deferential arbitrary
and capricious standard of review into ERISA, making it unlikely for any but the most
blatantly unreasonable administrator’s decisions to be overturned.”).
11. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 106 (“Despite Congress’s good intentions,
employees whose ERISA health claims had been denied still faced an uphill battle in federal
court.”).
12. See, e.g., Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914,
916 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ibromyalgia, ‘also known as fibrositis [is] a common, but elusive
and mysterious, disease, much like chronic fatigue syndrome, with which it shares a number
of features. Its cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to
disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective.’”) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d
305, 306–07 (7th Cir. 1996)); Rodriguez v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 676,
677 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The issue . . . is whether the malady known as ‘fibromyalgia’ is
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administrators have denied long-term disability benefits because they deem
the evidence for disability too subjective, therefore finding the claimant is
not disabled. 13 Administrators also include provisions in their contracts that
prevent long-term disability coverage for diseases that involve certain “selfreported” symptoms.14
The standard of review in a judicial appeal for a denial of long-term
disability benefits under ERISA in its current state does not allow a
claimant full and fair review, especially if the claimant suffers from a
subjective-proof disease. The medical perplexity involved in the etiology of
these diseases and the discretion given to plan administrators under these
claims make it very difficult for a claimant to overturn a denial of these
benefits. This Comment examines the policy implications of the bias
against subjective evidence as it is paired with the generous abuse of
discretion standard of review implemented in most denial of disability
benefits cases.
Part I of this Comment outlines the pathway of benefits claims under
ERISA and the road to federal court review of administrative decisions.
Part II discusses subjective-proof diseases and the types of evidence that
claimants bring forward in their attempts to obtain disability benefits. Part
III provides an overview of certain proof requirements in both ERISA
litigation and other areas of the law and analyzes how courts are handling
administrative denials for disability claims involving subjective proof.
Finally, Part IV suggests reforms to ensure protections for claimants who
apply for disability benefits for diseases and conditions that are only
diagnosable using subjective proof.

medically determinable, notwithstanding the absence of a definitive objective test for its
diagnosis.”).
13. See, e.g., Schnoor v. Walgreen Income Prot. Plan for Pharmacists & Registered
Nurses, 968 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873 (W.D. Mich. 2013).
14. See, e.g., Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 655 (8th Cir. 2006) (evaluating
a provision limiting disability benefits to twenty-four months if based on self-reported
symptoms, in this case fibromyalgia); Hilton v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 967 F. Supp.
2d 1114, 1116, 1120 (E.D. Va. 2013) (evaluating a provision limiting disability coverage to
twenty-four months in the case of self-reported migraine headache symptoms).
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I. The Disability Claims Process
A. The Cause of Action
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to implement a uniform set of rules and protections for
employees.15 Before its enactment, pension and other employee benefit plan
claims disputes were resolved as breaches of contract.16 The impetus for
ERISA was the “rapid and substantial” increase in the “size, scope, and
numbers of employee benefit plans.”17 The primary goal of ERISA was to
“protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”18
ERISA provides regulation for employer-provided welfare plans. 19
Under ERISA, a welfare plan is a “plan, fund, or program” created or
managed by an employer “for the purpose of providing” medical benefits to
its participants “in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or
unemployment.”20 ERISA defines disability as “the inability to work for
pay because of an injury or illness.” 21 In a 2018 survey, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics found that 34% of workers had access to employerprovided long-term disability insurance coverage, and that 97% of workers
who had access to an employer-sponsored plan participated in it.22
Many employers provide their employees with certain disability benefits,
which are covered by ERISA. 23 Disability benefits can be either short-term
or long-term and include “payments, usually monthly, to replace income

15. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
16. See Mark D. DeBofsky, A Critical Appraisal of the Current State of ERISA Civil
Procedure – An Examination of How Courts Treat “Civil Actions” Brought Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 203, 205 (2014).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
18. Id. § 1001(b).
19. STEVEN J. SACHER ET AL., ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW 26 (2d ed. 2000).
20. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)) (emphasis added).
21. Thomas Brown & Howard Hensley, Disability Benefit Plans, in EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS HANDBOOK 18-2 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1982).
22. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES tbl. 16 (Mar. 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2018/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march2018.pdf.
23. See id. at tbl. 2.
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lost due to inability to work as a result of illness, injury, or disease.” 24
Long-term Disability (LTD) insurance is a policy that protects an employee
from loss of income if he can no longer perform his job. 25 LTD benefits
begin paying out once short-term disability benefits have ended, typically
after three to five months.26 Employers typically provide LTD plans for
their employees as part of their compensation package (i.e., as fringe
benefits), but they are not required to do so. 27 Though short-term disability
benefits generally expire within two years, long-term disability plans “pay
extended benefits, generally until retirement age[].”28 Since they apply for
an extended period, “LTD benefits are frequently payable only if the
participant is unable to perform significant functions of any occupation for
which he or she is reasonably suited by skill, education, and experience.” 29
LTD plans entail a large portion of disability claims because “[t]he
present value of such claims can be substantial.” 30 The high value of these
claims is due to the potentially large payout if a claimant is young or highly
compensated, because the benefits will typically be awarded until the
claimant reaches retirement age. 31 Most employer-sponsored LTD plans
pay a fixed percentage of annual earnings to a worker awarded benefits. 32
According to the U.S. Department of Labor March 2018 survey, the median
fixed percent of annual earnings is 60%. 33 The same survey showed that
88% of claimants awarded LTD benefits received the maximum benefit
amount, with the ninetieth percentile receiving $15,000 per month.34
To obtain LTD benefits from his employer-provided plan, an employee
must show that he meets the disability requirements provided by his

24. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 358.
25. 1 PAUL J. ROUTH, WELFARE BENEFITS GUIDE § 2:28 (2019).
26. Id.
27. BALDWIN’S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES: EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LAW § 14:1 (Nov.
2019).
28. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 358.
29. Id. at 358–59 n.17; see also Brown & Hensley, supra note 21, at 18-2 (“[M]ost
long-term disability benefits are reserved for those who are unable to hold any substantial
employment for which they are qualified.”).
30. SACHER ET AL., supra note 19, at 1087.
31. Id.
32. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 22, at tbl. 29.
33. Id. at tbl. 30.
34. Id. at tbl. 31.
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employer’s plan.35 A participant files a claim with her plan administrator
for benefits in accordance with plan procedures.36 After a claim has been
made, ERISA directs that plan administrators must “(1) provide adequate
notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits
under the plan has been denied . . ., and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity
to any participant . . . for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” 37 Though not expressly
required under ERISA, federal courts have held that a claimant must
exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit.38
Under ERISA, plan administrators act as fiduciaries 39 because they
exercise discretionary authority, control, or responsibility respecting both
management and administration of employee welfare plans. 40 As a
fiduciary, plan administrators have specific duties under ERISA:
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and – (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing
benefits to participants and beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan[.]41
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides for a private
right of action for participants or beneficiaries “to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan.”42 These plans include “employee welfare benefit plans” which
encompass those plans that are “established or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its
35. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108–09 (2008) (finding that
claimant had to show a stricter standard—that she could not perform “‘the material duties of
any gainful occupation for which’ she was ‘reasonably qualified’”).
36. ERISA mandates internal appeal procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (2018).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1)–(2) (2012).
38. See, e.g., Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th
Cir. 1997); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1990); Amato v. Bernard, 618
F.2d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1980).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(a) (“[A]ny fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any
administrator . . . .”)).
40. Id. § 1002(21)(A).
41. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
42. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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participants . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, [or] disability.” 43 When a claimant appeals
the denial of an LTD benefit to the district court, he is exercising his right
to a private action under ERISA.
B. Standard of Review
Though lengthy and elaborate, ERISA does not set forth a standard of
review for appeals of claim denials. 44 Before the Supreme Court’s decision
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, federal courts imported the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard found in the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) to claims under ERISA. 45 Under this standard, if a
plan administrator is found to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying a claim for benefits, then that denial is overturned on appeal.46 In
Firestone, the Court refused to import the entirety of LMRA’s “arbitrary
and capricious” standard to ERISA, and attempted to provide guidance for
federal courts as to how to review appeals for denial of benefits. 47
The Court determined that the correct standard of review analysis would
be found in trust law, as “ERISA abounds with the language and
terminology of trust law.”48 The Court noted that “[t]rust principles make a
deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises
discretionary powers.”49 For example, plan administrators exercise
43. Id. § 1002(1).
44. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (“ERISA does not
set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging
benefit eligibility determinations.”).
45. Id.
46. See Beam v. Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir.
1975); see also Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1987) (describing arbitrary and capricious standard as imported from the FMLA)
(“[W]hen a plan provision as interpreted had the effect of denying an application for benefits
unreasonably, or, as it came to be said, arbitrarily and capriciously, courts would hold that
the plan as ‘structured’ was not for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees, so that
the denial of benefits violated [§ 186(c)].”).
47. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109–10.
48. Id. at 111. “In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under §
1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.” Id. at 110 (citing Central States, Se.
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)).
49. Id. at 111 (noting that “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect
to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent
an abuse by the trustee of his discretion”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS:
CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
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discretionary powers when a plan grants them authority to determine if a
claimant is entitled to benefits.50 The favorable standard of review toward
fiduciaries and trustees comes from the idea that “a court of equity will not
interfere to control [trustees] in the exercise of a discretion vested in them
by the instrument under which they act.”51 The plan at issue in Firestone
did not have a provision granting the plan administrator discretionary
authority, but the Court determined that such a clause would lead to the
more deferential standard of review. 52 And now, almost all plans have such
a clause.53
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts lists six factors to consider when
determining whether a fiduciary has abused his discretion:
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the
terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of
the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness or
indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the
reasonableness of the trustee’s conduct can be judged; (5) the
motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising
the power; [and] (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest
in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries. 54

50. Id. at 113.
51. Id. at 111 (quoting Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724–25 (1875)).
52. Id. at 111, 115.
53. See Peter A. Meyers, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and Standard of
Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925, 927 (2005) (“In most
circuits, however, evidence of abusive practices will not come to light; so long as the plan
document explicitly gives the fiduciary discretion to make benefit determinations . . . .”);
see, e.g., Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (providing
an example of a reservation-of-discretion clause in an ERISA plan) (“Benefits under this
plan will be paid only if (the plan administrator) decides in its discretion that (the claimant)
is entitled to them. (The plan administrator) also has discretion to determine eligibility for
benefits and to interpret the terms and conditions of the benefit plan.”) (quoting Utah
Insurance Rule 590-218-5(3)).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1959). Though Supreme Court case law references the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts in its evaluation of ERISA appeals, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts was
published in 2005. The principles of abuse of discretion review remain unchanged.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 87 cmt.
d (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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For purposes of ERISA review, “the most important [factor] is the presence
of any conflicts of interest on the part of the plan fiduciary.”55
Although the Supreme Court instructed courts to contemplate a plan
administrator’s conflict of interest in reviewing ERISA appeals, the lack of
instruction led to circuits developing differing approaches. 56 One method,
the “sliding scale” approach, was adopted by the Third, Fourth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits.57 Other approaches adopted by the circuit courts
involved shifting the burden to the plan administrator to prove that the
decision was not an abuse of discretion when a conflict of interest existed,
or simply continuing to use the standards similar to the arbitrary and
capricious review promulgated pre-Firestone.58
Though drawing from trust law for the proper standard, the Court in
“Firestone likely flipped the presumption of trust law, which traditionally
assumes deference unless the trust says otherwise.” 59 The Court held “that a
denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan.”60 Under a de novo standard of review, a court
“decid[es] the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or
assumption made by the previous court to hear the case.” 61 If the plan does
grant the plan administrator authority to determine eligibility, then the court
reviews the decision to determine if the plan administrator abused his
discretion in denying benefits to the claimant. 62 Though the Fifth Circuit
had held that the de novo standard of review espoused in Firestone was
limited to the construing of plan terms,63 in Ariana v. Humana Health Plan
of Texas, Inc., it joined with the rest of the circuits in applying de novo
55. Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114.
56. Ryan M. LoRusso, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn: Will the
Supreme Court Decision Reduce Confusion after Firestone?, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 189, 197
(2010).
57. Id. at 199.
58. Id. at 197–200; see also Stevenson, supra note 10, at 115–30 (providing a
breakdown of each circuit’s approach).
59. Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 884 F.3d 246, 253 (5th Cir. 2018)
(footnote omitted) (citing Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 203–05 (7th Cir. 1996)).
60. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
61. DeNovo, LEGAL INFO. INST. (July 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo.
62. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
63. See Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552,
1561–62 (5th Cir. 1991).
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review in all cases where the plan does not grant discretion. 64 Though a step
in the right direction, the fact is that most plans will grant discretionary
authority to plan administrators.
When determining whether a plan administrator has abused its discretion
under ERISA, courts will typically look at whether there is substantial
evidence to support the administrator’s finding, 65 or whether the decision
was arbitrary.66 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that the abuse of
discretion standard and the arbitrary and capricious standard are
synonymous.67 The Eighth Circuit has held that “if an administrator’s
decision ‘is extraordinarily imprudent or extremely unreasonable, the court
is likely to find that there has been an abuse of discretion.’”68
Circuit courts evaluate for an abuse of discretion under differing
factors.69 When addressing the issue of a plan administrator’s conflict of
interest, the Supreme Court iterated that under the law of trusts, “if a benefit
plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under
a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”70 Thus, when an
“insurer acts as both funding source and administrator,” courts will consider
that conflict in their evaluation and adjust the leniency of the standard. 71
64. Ariana, 884 F.3d at 250–53.
65. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 468 F.3d
1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To be reasonable [under the abuse of discretion standard], the
decision must be supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Norris v. Citibank, N.A.
Disability Plan (501), 308 F.3d 880, 883–84 (8th Cir. 2002)).
66. Keller v. AT&T Disability Income Plan, 664 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699–700 (W.D. Tex.
2009) (“An abuse of discretion exists if the administrator’s factual determinations are
arbitrary and are not supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp.
v. Sterling Chem., 168 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1999)).
67. Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010).
68. Goewert v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727 (E.D. Mo.
2006) (quoting Cox v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1992)).
69. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits
Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) – Fiduciary Conflict of Interest–Post-Firestone Cases,
18 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 607, § 4 (2007) (compiling cases where circuit courts take fiduciary
discretion into account).
70. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS § 187 cmt. d
(AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
71. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir.
2011) (citing Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify how reviewing courts should take into account plan
administrators’ conflict of interest. 72 The Court reiterated that plan
administrators hold conflicting interests because they “both determine[]
whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pay[] benefits out of [their]
own pocket[s].”73 In Glenn, the claimant was diagnosed with dilated
cardiopathy, which presents through symptoms of “fatigue and shortness of
breath.”74 She applied through her employer plan provider, MetLife, for
disability benefits and was granted short-term disability for a term of
twenty-four months.75 MetLife then directed her to pursue a claim for
Social Security Benefits, which MetLife could use to offset the amount they
were paying out on the plan. 76 An administrative law court granted Glenn
the Social Security benefits, as it “found that Glenn’s illness prevented
her . . . ‘from performing any jobs [for which she could qualify] existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.’” 77
To continue receiving disability payments from MetLife, Glenn had to
show “that her medical condition rendered her incapable of performing . . .
‘the material duties of any gainful occupation for which’ she was
‘reasonably qualified.’”78 MetLife denied long-term disability benefits, and
Glenn brought a federal suit in response. 79 The district court upheld the
denial of benefits, and Glenn appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 80 The Sixth
Circuit reviewed the denial under a deferential standard and treated the plan
administrator’s conflict of interest as a relevant factor, as MetLife both
decided whether an employee was entitled to benefits and paid out those
benefits. 81
The Court of Appeals set aside the denial for a variety of reasons, 82 and
MetLife petitioned for certiorari to determine whether it acted under a
72. 554 U.S. 105, 112–19 (2008).
73. Id. at 108.
74. Id. at 109.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting the petition for certiorari).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 110.
82. The Sixth Circuit set aside the denial of benefits because
(1) the conflict of interest; (2) MetLife’s failure to reconcile its own conclusion
that Glenn could work in other jobs with the Social Security Administration’s
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conflict of interest.83 The Solicitor General requested in an amicus curiae
brief that the Court provide guidance on how these conflicts of interest
should be treated and weighed on appeal. 84 The Court addressed both of
these questions, in turn, in an attempt to bridge the divide between circuit
courts in their interpretation of the holding in Firestone.85
In interpreting Firestone’s use of administrative conflict of interest as a
factor in evaluating ERISA determinations, the Court elaborated that this
weighing does not change the standard of review from abuse of discretion
to de novo review. 86 The Court refused to overturn Firestone and
implement universal de novo review because it believed that Congress did
not intend for such judicial oversight of plan administration. 87 The Court
also noted that “[b]enefits decisions arise in too many contexts, concern too
many circumstances, and can relate in too many different ways to
conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system
that is likely to promote fair and accurate review.”88 The Court went on to
approve the Sixth Circuit’s “combination-of-factors method of review,” in
which the court weighs many different fact-specific factors, including a
conflict of interest, in coming to its decision. 89
The Court noted that its “elucidation of Firestone’s standard d[id] not
consist of a detailed set of instructions.” 90 The Court avoided providing a
set procedural and reviewing process because of “the impalpable factors
involved in judicial review.”91 In his concurrence in part, Chief Justice John
Roberts disagreed with the majority’s treatment of a plan administrator’s
conclusion that she could not; (3) MetLife’s focus upon one treating physician
report suggesting that Glenn could work in other jobs at the expense of other,
more detailed treating physician reports indicating that she could not; (4)
MetLife’s failure to provide all of the treating physician reports to its own hired
experts; and (5) MetLife’s failure to take account of evidence indicating that
stress aggravated Glenn’s condition.
Id. (citing Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 674 (6th Cir. 2006)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22,
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No. 06-923)).
85. Id. at 112–19.
86. Id. at 115 (“We do not believe that Firestone’s statement implies a change in the
standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review.”).
87. Id. at 116.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 118.
90. Id. at 119.
91. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).
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conflict of interest as a factor motivating more exacting scrutiny by the
reviewing court.92 He wrote that the majority’s focus on “the mere
existence of a conflict” tempts courts to substitute their discretion in place
of the plan administrator’s.93 He continued, “This problem is exacerbated
because the majority is so imprecise about how the existence of a conflict
should be treated in a reviewing court’s analysis.”94
Even after the decision in Glenn, circuit courts have interpreted the
holding in Firestone differently. 95 Many circuits that had used the “slidingscale” test in formulating the standard of review rejected that approach. 96
This rebuff stems from the appellate court determination that Glenn
instructed courts to “take the conflict into account not in formulating the
standard of review, but in determining whether the administrator or
fiduciary abused its discretion[.]”97 Contrastingly, the Tenth Circuit has
reconciled the Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn with the “sliding-scale”
approach.98 The Tenth Circuit ruled that it “dial[ed] back” deference if the
plan administrator operated under a conflict of interest.99 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit still applies an arbitrary and capricious standard, but “decreas[es]
the level of deference given . . . in proportion to the seriousness of the
conflict.”100
Though Supreme Court jurisprudence allows deference when a
discretionary clause is present, many states have attempted to ensure
claimant rights by outlawing the enforcement of discretionary clauses. 101
State legislatures are trying to protect the claimant, but they are not always
successful because of ERISA’s preemption of state law. 102 ERISA
“supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any
92. Id. at 121 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
93. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
94. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114–32.
96. Id. at 134 (citing Estate of Schwing v. Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir.
2009); Champion v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2008)).
97. Estate of Schwing, 562 F.3d at 525.
98. Weber v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2008).
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum Co., 491
F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)).
101. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.6 (West 2019), invalidated by Williby v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2017).
102. See, e.g., Williby, 867 F.3d at 1136–37.
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employee benefit plan” ERISA covers.103 For example, in Williby v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit found that California’s statute
outlawing the enforcement of discretionary clauses did not apply to an
ERISA short-term disability plan.104 In this case, the district court reviewed
Aetna’s denial of short-term disability under a de novo standard, finding
that Aetna improperly denied Williby’s claim. 105 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded “for reconsideration under the proper
standard of review,” i.e., abuse of discretion. 106
Contrarily, the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA does not preempt an
Illinois regulation prohibiting discretionary clauses in health and disability
insurance policies.107 The Illinois insurance regulation explained:
No policy, contract, certificate, endorsement, rider application or
agreement offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to
provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or reimburse any of the
costs of health care services or of a disability may contain a
provision purporting to reserve discretion to the health carrier to
interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide standards of
interpretation or review that are inconsistent with the laws of this
State.108
In Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., MetLife argued that
ERISA preempted the Illinois regulation, and the court’s review should be
under an arbitrary and capricious standard. 109 The Seventh Circuit rejected
that argument, finding that the Illinois regulation was applicable because it
fell under an exception to ERISA preemption that saves state laws “which
regulate[] insurance.”110 By allowing the application of the Illinois
regulation, the Seventh Circuit ensured that the Illinois state legislature’s
attempt to protect claimant interests was effectuated. 111

103. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
104. See Williby, 867 F.3d at 1137.
105. Id. at 1131.
106. Id.
107. Fontaine v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 886 (quoting 50 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2001.3 (2002)).
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
111. With the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Fontaine, it joined the Sixth Circuit in
allowing application of state laws prohibiting discretionary clauses. Id.; see Am. Council of
Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2009).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/5

2020]

COMMENT

689

II. Putting Fibromyalgia in the Patient Chair to Understand SubjectiveProof Diseases
Doctors diagnose many diseases today based on subjective reports. 112
These subjective reports might include complaints of pain, suicidal
thoughts, and reports of extreme emotions, such as those that may lead to
the diagnosis of a phobia.113 For example, agoraphobia, or the fear of
people, does not have an objective medical test.114 A doctor does not test a
vial of blood or perform an MRI to determine if a patient has an intense fear
of crowds or strangers. Diagnosis of phobias occurs purely through an indepth interview with the patient and an evaluation of medical, psychiatric,
and familial histories. 115 The diagnosis for diseases such as General Anxiety
Disorder is similar.116 The doctor relies on the reports of the patient to
determine a diagnosis, even if this disease would not typically be treated
with medicine but with a form of psychotherapy.117
This Comment uses the term “subjective-proof” disease to refer to a
disease for which there is no objective medical test to determine the
diagnosis. An objective medical test would include measures such as an xray, which would clearly show a broken bone, or an MRI, which would
show a tumor in an organ. For example, fibromyalgia is a subjective-proof
disease because there is no viable objective medical test. Since “no
underlying measurable or pathophysiological causes have been
confirmed[,]” the condition is rendered “incompatible with
medical/scientific models that emphasize measurable criteria.” 118
Fibromyalgia is one subjective-proof disease that is common in disability
112. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 688–89 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing subjectivity of diagnosing personality
disorders).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 432–33.
115. Specific Phobias, MAYO CLINIC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/specific-phobias/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20355162.
116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 112, at 476 (indicating that diagnosis of
Generalized Anxiety Disorder includes association with three of the following six
symptoms: “(1) restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge[;] (2) being easily fatigued[;] (3)
difficulty concentrating or mind going blank[;] (4) irritability[;] (5) muscle tension[;] (6)
sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep)”).
117. See Specific Phobias, supra note 115 (“The best treatment for specific phobias is a
form of psychotherapy called exposure therapy.”).
118. Sean M. Hayes et al., Fibromyalgia and the Therapeutic Relationship: Where
Uncertainty Meets Attitude, 15 PAIN RES. & MGMT. 385, 386 (2010).
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appeals, but it is far from the only disease in which diagnosis is based on
subjective evidence. Other subjective-proof diseases include chronic fatigue
syndrome, schizophrenia, mental illnesses, and phobias.119 Classifying a
diagnosis as a subjective-proof disease renders the disease incompatible
with claims for long-term disability benefits and complicates the analysis
for appellate courts. Some plan administrators have argued that diseases
such as fibromyalgia are not “medically determinable,” and therefore
claimants cannot show entitlement to disability benefits.120
To examine the issues involved in appeals of denials of disability claims
for subjective-proof diseases, this Comment will use fibromyalgia as its
principal example. “Fibromyalgia is a disorder characterized by widespread
musculoskeletal pain accompanied by fatigue, sleep, memory and mood
issues.”121 Fibromyalgia is frequently litigated in disability appeals because
of its subjective nature.122 An employee with fibromyalgia might pursue a
disability claim because the pain is so great that she cannot work. 123 There
is evidence that “fibromyalgia involves differences in the processing of
pain, particularly in the processing of sensory input and painful stimuli.” 124
The Mayo Clinic notes that “[d]octors don’t know what causes
fibromyalgia, but it most likely involves a variety of factors working
together.”125 The factors listed include genetics, infections, and physical or
emotional trauma.126

119. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 677–78 (9th Cir.
2011) (“There are no specific diagnostic studies (i.e., laboratory, radiography,
psychosomatic or other testing) or physical findings that are specific to the diagnosis of
[chronic fatigue syndrome].”) (quoting the Center for Disease Control criteria) (emphasis
removed); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 112, at 688.
120. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 676, 677–78
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
121. Fibromyalgia, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/fibromyalgia/symptoms-causes/syc-20354780.
122. See, e.g., Johnson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 437 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2006);
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2003).
123. See, e.g., Huffaker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 271 F. App’x 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2008);
Billinger v. Bell Atl., 240 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
124. Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 386 (citations omitted).
125. Fibromyalgia, supra note 121.
126. Id.; see Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 386 (“A genetic basis for the syndrome has
also been explored.”).
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The methods of diagnosis for fibromyalgia have changed over the
years.127 One test frequently mentioned in cases evaluating a denial for
disability benefits is the “tender-points test.”128 The tender-points test
involves a physician pressing on certain points on a patient’s body and
determining the amount of pain felt by the patient through subjective
responses. 129 Criticism of the “semi-objective” tender-points test alleges
that “cervical tender points were almost impossible to assess” and “[w]hen
physicians began the tender point examination, the patient’s interview had
already provided clues as to what the examination results might be.” 130
Instead of an objectively diagnosable disease, “[f]ibromyalgia diagnosis
often depended on physician referral, behavioral and emotional
characteristics of patients, and the skill, interest, and beliefs of the
physicians.”131
In recent years, the medical community has developed new ways to
diagnose fibromyalgia.132 In 2010, the American College of Rheumatology
developed new fibromyalgia criteria “that excluded tender points, but
included a count of pain locations and the physician’s rating of the most
discriminative symptoms.”133 While the test’s criteria is not absolutely
objective, about 50% of the criteria were accounted for with
musculoskeletal pain, whereas “the other 50% came from fatigue, sleep,
cognitive problems, and an estimate of the overall degree of somatic
symptom severity.”134 These new diagnostic tools are still criticized, as “[i]t
seems certain that physicians will differ in their conscientiousness in
making such assessments and their interpretation of the severity of patient
complaints.”135
127. Frederick Wolfe et al., What Is Fibromyalgia, How Is It Diagnosed, and What Does
It Really Mean?, 66 ARTHRITIS CARE & RES. 969, 969–70 (2014).
128. Id. at 969; see, e.g., Rogers v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir.
2007); Small v. Astrue, 840 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460–61 (D. Mass. 2012).
129. See Brown v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 771, 773 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Clinical signs
and symptoms supporting a diagnosis of fibromyalgia under the American College of
Rheumatology Guidelines include ‘primarily widespread pain in all four quadrants of the
body and at least 11 of the 18 specified tender points on the body.’”) (quoting GreenYounger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)).
130. Wolfe et al., supra note 127, at 969.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Doctors within the medical community have differing attitudes towards
fibromyalgia.136 There is still debate as to “whether fibromyalgia is a
credible diagnosis at all.”137 In one survey, doctors and medical students
ranked fibromyalgia “among the lowest in credibility of conditions.”138 In a
study analyzing physician and specialist attitudes toward fibromyalgia,
researchers found that “[a] total of 35% of [general practitioners] lacked
confidence in using the American College of Rheumatology (ACR)
criteria.”139 In the same study, only “[t]wo-thirds of participants . . .
characterized fibromyalgia as diagnosable” though most who did so
“commented on the subjectivity of the assessment.”140 Researchers
presented a generalized view of fibromyalgia:
In summary, fibromyalgia is characterized by undefined
pathophysiology, uncertainty about diagnostic criteria, lack of
knowledge regarding effective and safe treatments, and the need
for a broad range of support and intervention that physicians are
ill equipped to provide. These factors combine to create a
climate of mismatched perceptions and unmet needs on the parts
of both patients and physicians in the treatment of
fibromyalgia.141
The attitudes and medical processes involved in diagnosing diseases
such as fibromyalgia produce difficulty when courts evaluate appeals from
disability denials. This unease is true for both long-term disability claims
and Social Security benefits claims. The Tenth Circuit has noted that
“[w]hat makes fibromyalgia difficult to analyze . . . is the lack of objective
symptoms[.]”142 In an appeal from a denial of Social Security benefits, the
Tenth Circuit held that an administrative law judge’s failure to accord
severe-impairment status to the claimant’s diagnosed fibromyalgia was
reversible error.143

136. See Hayes et al., supra note 118, at 385.
137. Id. at 386 (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 387.
140. Id. (“It’s very subjective, so this is just based on a faith in patients saying [. . .] ‘It
hurts; my [. . .] is sore.’ But you don’t have a measure of how much you can press the
[tender] point.”) (quoting a general practitioner from the study).
141. Id. at 389.
142. Brown v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 771, 773 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006).
143. Id. at 773.
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Though fibromyalgia and other subjective-proof diseases produce
difficulty for both the medical and legal communities, scientists are
conducting studies to measure pain objectively. 144 Instead of using a “10point scale” or “emoji-style charts” that convey different levels of pain
through facial expression, scientists aim to measure pain using “brain scans,
pupil reactions and other possible markers of pain.” 145 As one researcher
puts bluntly, “If we can’t measure pain, we can’t fix it.” 146 Though
incomplete, this research could potentially ease the burden of claimants
attempting to obtain disability benefits, as it would provide objective
evidence of their disease. It is unclear how long until any of these research
efforts may provide usable results.147
III. The Legal Landscape
A. The Objective Evidence Requirement
Fibromyalgia muddles a court’s evaluation, as “[t]he subjective and
inherently self-reported nature of fibromyalgia’s primary symptoms of pain
and fatigue complicate disability benefit decisions and the review of benefit
denials.”148 While recognizing that fibromyalgia’s “cause or causes are
unknown” and “there is no cure,” 149 courts have still found that “the
physical limitations imposed by the symptoms of such illnesses do lend
themselves to objective analysis.”150
While there may be some requirement for objective evidence of the
limitations fibromyalgia may impose on a claimant, some “[c]ourts have
held that it is prima facie unreasonable to require claimants to submit
objective evidence of the etiology of the disease, given that there are no
recognized objective laboratory tests.”151 Although it may be impossible to
144. Lauran Neergaard, No Stethoscope for Pain: Scientists Seek Real Way to Measure,
AP NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/c75e6a1185024a7c8892dacf56e6e308.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting pediatric anesthesiologist at Children’s National Medical Center in
Washington, Dr. Julia Finkel).
147. See id.
148. Adams v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ.A. H-04-2179, 2005 WL 2030840,
at *31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2005).
149. Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 872 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001)).
150. Boardman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 337 F.3d 9, 16–17 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003).
151. Adams, 2005 WL 2030840, at *32 (citing Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d
433 (3d Cir. 1997); Cook v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 320 F.3d 11, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2003);
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have objective proof of the disease itself, “courts have recognized that an
insurer may insist on objective proof and measures of symptoms and of
limits on the ability to work, even when, as with fibromyalgia, diagnosis is
difficult and subjective complaints such as ‘fatigue’ or ‘pain’ are the
signature of the disease.”152
Objective evidence of disability that stems from a subjectively
diagnosable disease may come from tests such as Functional Capacity
Evaluations (FCEs), home assessments, occupational therapy appraisals,
independent medical examinations, and ADL (Aids to Daily Living). 153
These tests give doctors an idea of the mobility and strength that a claimant
may be able to exert during a workday.154 If a claimant can perform some of
the ADL, “then she is disabled partially; if she can’t do most of them she is
severely disabled.”155 In Liebel v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the claimant
presented multiple doctors’ evaluations, an FCE, a home assessment, and
an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME). 156 During the FCE, “while Ms.
Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.); Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999); Burchill v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 327 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (D. Me. 2004); Pralutsky v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 840, 852–53 (D. Minn. 2004); Maronde v. Sumco USA Grp. LongTerm Disability Plan, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (D. Or. 2004); Sansevera v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 859 F. Supp. 106, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
152. Id. (citing Friedrich, 181 F.3d at 1112; Boardman, 337 F.3d at 16–17 & n.5).
153. See generally Liebel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 595 F. App’x 755, 759–61 (10th Cir.
2014); Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 00-1439-DWB, 2007 WL 4374219 (D.
Kan. Dec. 13, 2007), vacated by Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 649 F. Supp. 2d
1220 (D. Kan. 2009). “A functional capacity evaluation (FCE) evaluates an individual’s
capacity to perform work activities related to his or her participation in employment.”
Functional Capacity Evaluation, AM. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY ASS’N, INC.,
https://www.aota.org/About-Occupational-Therapy/Professionals/WI/Capacity-Eval.aspx
(last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (citing Remko Soer et al., Towards Consensus in Operational
Definitions in Functional Capacity Evaluation: A Delphi Survey, 18 J. OCCUPATIONAL
REHABILITATION 389 (2008)). The evaluation procedure “compares the individual’s health
status, and body functions and structures to the demands of the job and the work
environment.” Id. An ADL assessment involves observing or evaluating a claimant’s ability
to perform daily living activities, including for example, “(a) bathing, (b) continence, (c)
dressing/grooming, (d) eating, (e) mobility, (f) toileting, and (g) transferring (i.e., ability to
move from one place to another, including bed to chair and back, and into and out of a
vehicle).” Merie B. ex rel. Brayden O. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 863
N.W.2d 171, 178 (Neb. 2015).
154. See Liebel, 595 F. App’x at 757–61.
155. Welch, 2007 WL 4374219, at *9 (emphasis removed).
156. Liebel, 595 F. App’x at 759–61.
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Liebel complained of pain during the evaluation, ‘[p]hysiological responses
(heart rate and respiratory rate) did not correlate with [her] subjective
complaints of severe pain.’”157 Although Ms. Liebel had diagnoses of
fibromyalgia, radiculopathy, failed back syndrome, narcotic use, and
complained of pain, the court upheld the administrator’s decision to deny
benefits. 158 The court based its denial on the results of the functional
evaluations and the evaluating doctors’ determinations that the claimant’s
diseases did not render her unable to work at a sedentary level. 159
Courts have found it reasonable to weigh a claimant’s credibility when
most of the evidence given to support a claim for disability is subjective. 160
These courts’ evaluation weighs more than just formal reports of motion
and mobility, allowing the consideration of surveillance footage of the
claimant when assessing the insurer’s denial.161 If subjective complaints of
pain do not match with the surveillance footage, a court will likely uphold a
denial for benefits.
In Rizzi v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., the plan participant
claimed disability because of “extreme pain and not being able to use [her]
right extremities properly” and a diagnosis of Myofascial Pain
Syndrome. 162 The plan administrator initially granted Rizzi disability
benefits, but Hartford conducted a follow-up evaluation three months after
approval to check her condition.163 After this interview, in which Rizzi
stated “her average pain level was an 8-10 on a scale of 1 to 10,” Hartford
began surveilling Rizzi. 164 Hartford observed Rizzi driving, bending at a
ninety-degree angle, and clasping various items; she displayed no evidence
157. Id. at 759 (quoting the report).
158. Id. at 764–65.
159. Id.
160. See Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 221 F. App’x 696, 705–06
(10th Cir. 2007).
161. Plan administrators may covertly surveil claimants to observe mobility or activity.
The Tenth Circuit has “implicitly endorsed using surveillance footage to document abuse of
total disability benefits.” Courtney Bru, Big Brother’s Watching—And He Can Fire You,
Too, Okla. Emp. L. Letter, Apr. 2007, at 5 (vol. 15, no. 4); see also Jerel C. Dawson,
Subjective Tension: The Conundrum of Self-Reported Symptoms, DRI for Def., Sept. 2008.
at 70 (vol. 50, no. 9) (“Video surveillance[] . . . is a cost-effective and under-utilized tool
that can assist insurers and courts by furnishing objective documentation of disparities
between a claimant’s subjectively reported limitations and his or her actual capabilities.”).
162. 383 F. App’x 738, 741 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting appellant’s application).
163. Id. at 742.
164. Id. at 742–43.
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of pain.165 Hartford then terminated Rizzi’s disability benefits. 166 Rizzi
appealed her denial of benefits, alleging that “Hartford’s denial of benefits
was arbitrary and capricious because of its . . . reliance on surveillance
evidence[] [and] disregard of her subjective complaints of pain[,]” among
other stated reasons.167 One of the evaluating doctors found that “the lack of
objective medical evidence coupled with the surveillance evidence raised
questions concerning Rizzi’s probity when self-reporting the level of her
pain and functionality of her right arm.” 168 This determination was
especially relevant because “no other treating physicians documented any
physical symptoms (like muscle atrophy, hair loss or nail discoloration)
associated with an inability to mobilize or use her extremities.” 169
Other courts have held that disability benefits denials may be arbitrary
and capricious when an evaluating physician disregards a claimant’s
subjective complaints of pain. 170 The Ninth Circuit found in Salomaa v.
Honda Long Term Disability Plan that a denial based solely on the lack of
objective evidence was an abuse of discretion. 171 The court applied the
abuse of discretion standard instead of de novo review because the plan
“expressly and unambiguously g[ave] the administrator discretion to
determine eligibility.”172 The claimant was diagnosed with “chronic fatigue
syndrome,” which is diagnosed “by exclusion of other underlying
diseases.”173 The reviewing court found the denial to be an abuse of
discretion because “the plan administrator demanded objective tests to
establish the existence of a condition for which there are no objective
tests.”174 The plan administrators also refused to conduct their own physical

165. Id. at 743.
166. Id. at 745.
167. Id. at 747.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 753.
170. See Cruz-Baca v. Edison Int’l Long Term Disability Plan, 708 F. App’x 313, 315
(9th Cir. 2017) (“It was arbitrary and capricious for Dr. Ramachandran Srinivasan to fail to
discuss and consider Cruz-Baca’s subjective complaints of pain as evidence of her chronic
pain syndrome.”).
171. 642 F.3d 666, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2011).
172. Id. at 673; see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109
(1989).
173. Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 678 (quoting the Center for Disease Control criteria)
(emphasis removed).
174. Id. at 676.
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evaluations of the claimant and only paid medical professionals to review
Salomaa’s file. 175
Although courts have found it unreasonable to require claimants to show
objective evidence regarding the diagnosis of a disease such as
fibromyalgia, it is not unreasonable to require objective evidence of the
disability that renders the claimant unable to work. When the evidence does
not show that the symptoms of fibromyalgia or a similar disease prevent the
claimant from completing the actions of a normal workday or even the
actions of a modified normal workday to accommodate a sedentary level of
activity, a court will not typically overturn an insurer’s denial of a claim.
Commonly, when a covered employee makes a claim for disability under
ERISA, he simultaneously makes a claim for disability under the Social
Security Act, and many private long-term disability plans encourage
claimants to also file for Social Security benefits. 176 Under the Social
Security Act, there is a “treating physician rule” that requires administrative
law judges to accord “special weight . . . [to the] opinions of the claimant’s
treating physician.”177 The Ninth Circuit attempted to attach this rule to
review of ERISA plans, but the Supreme Court overturned this
determination in Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord.178 The Supreme
Court refused to bring the “treating physician rule” over to ERISA claims
because “[n]othing in the Act itself . . . suggests that plan administrators
must accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians” and
ERISA does not “impose a heightened burden of explanation on
administrators when they reject a treating physician’s opinion.” 179
Therefore, treating physicians are given less deference under ERISA claims
than those for Social Security, though many involve the same disability. It
falls upon the Secretary of Labor to adopt a treating physician rule for
ERISA claims.180 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Black & Decker, writing for
a unanimous Court, suggests that the Court would be deferential to, and
likely uphold, such adoption of the rule by the Secretary of Labor.
175. Id.
176. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 (2008) (“MetLife . . . directed
Glenn to a law firm that would assist her in applying for federal Social Security disability
benefits . . . .”).
177. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003) (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (2002)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 831.
180. See id.
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When a claimant is denied, he must exhaust his administrative remedies,
then may appeal the decision to the appropriate district court, and then on to
the appropriate appellate court.181 When appealing a denial of disability
benefits, the district court is generally limited to reviewing the
administrative record. 182 This limited scope is not how most district court
cases are resolved—consistent with the normal application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in a civil action. 183 There is no discovery, and the
district court does not hear new evidence in an appeal for denial of
disability benefits:
[J]udicial review is confined to the administrative record before
the ERISA plan administrator, and, thus, the district court sits
more as an appellate tribunal than as a trial court, in that it does
not take evidence, but, rather, evaluates the reasonableness of an
administrative determination in light of the record compiled
before the plan fiduciary.184
This review of the “administrative record” is analogous to the type of
review found in administrative proceedings. 185 In an administrative
proceeding, adjudicatory power lies with an administrative law judge or a
publicly appointed official. 186 For example, in a claim for Social Security
benefits, “[t]he Commissioner of Social Security is directed to make
findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for
a payment under [the Social Security Act].” 187 In an ERISA benefits
proceeding, adjudicatory power lies “in the hands of plan administrators,
181. See supra Section I.A.
182. See DeBofsky, supra note 16, at 204.
183. See id.
184. Wooster, supra note 69, § 8.
185. See Roy F. Harmon III, The Debate over Deference in the ERISA Setting – Judicial
Review of Decisions by Conflicted Fiduciaries, 54 S.D. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). Harmon argues
that the Supreme Court’s decision in MetLife further aligns administrative law principles
with administrative proceedings:
Though framed in terms of trust law, the standard of review applied in most
ERISA cases is essentially the same as that applied when federal courts review
administrative agency actions. In both contexts, the standard of review can
afford broad discretion to decision-makers and suppress inquiries, and thereby
disputes, regarding matters outside the administrative record.
Id.
186. See 28 C.F.R. § 68.28 (2019).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2012).
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who may frequently have a vested interest in the proceedings.” 188 Though
claimants are still allowed a civil action, claimant advocates argue that
“[w]ith a judicial process that denies claimants a full opportunity to
challenge the basis for adverse claim decisions, the civil action authorized
by section 502 of ERISA is often rendered meaningless.”189
B. Language of the Insurance Plan
Courts have looked to the language of the insurance plan to determine if
a denial of benefits is arbitrary or capricious. In an opinion that was later
vacated due to a settlement, the United States District Court for Kansas
analyzed the requirements of a policy’s “self-report clause” in relation to a
claim for disability based on a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. 190 Though
vacated, the opinion provides relevant analysis of the interaction of
fibromyalgia claims with plan terms that require objective evidence or limit
availability of benefits for self-reported symptoms. The district court sought
to determine whether the plan administrator’s denial of the claim for
benefits due to fibromyalgia was arbitrary and capricious due to the
application of the plan’s self-reported symptoms limitation.191
The applicable provision of the plan “limit[ed] disability payments to a
period of 24 months for ‘[d]isabilities, due to sickness or injury, which are
primarily based on self-reported symptoms.”192 The plan defined selfreported symptoms as “the manifestations of your condition which you tell
your doctor, that are not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical
examinations standardly accepted in the practice of medicine.”193 The court
maintained that to limit benefits on the question of “whether Ms. Welch’s
fibromyalgia itself was diagnosed primarily on self-reported symptoms . . .
[the insurer] would have acted arbitrarily and capriciously.” 194 But since
UNUM, the plan administrator, “based its denial on whether Ms. Welch’s
188. Harmon, supra note 185, at 3.
189. DeBofsky, supra note 16, at 214.
190. Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 00-1439-DWB, 2007 WL 4374219, at
*1 (D. Kan. Dec. 13, 2007), vacated by Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 649 F. Supp.
2d 1220 (D. Kan. 2009).
191. Id. (quoting Welch v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 382 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir.
2004)).
192. Id. at *3 (quoting the language of the policy).
193. Id. (quoting the language of the policy). The plan also listed examples of selfreported symptoms that included “headaches, pain, fatigue, stiffness, soreness, ringing in
ears, dizziness, numbness and loss of energy.” Id. (quoting the language of the policy).
194. Id. at *5.
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claimed disability was based on self-reported symptoms that could not be
verified by tests or procedures,” the court found the provision
enforceable. 195
In distinguishing the case at bar, the district court noted that “cases
where courts have concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to require
objective evidence of fibromyalgia (or other similar diseases such as
chronic fatigue syndrome) have generally involved factual situations where
the plan itself contained no self-report provision.”196 Conversely, the court
found that UNUM had incorrectly applied the self-report clause to Welch’s
fibromyalgia symptoms. 197 The court reasoned that UNUM improperly
“disregard[ed] the caveat that even self-reported symptoms such as pain
may fall outside of the plan definition where there are tests, procedures or
clinical examinations standardly accepted in the practice of medicine that
would verify the severity of the patient’s reported pain.”198 The availability
of clinical examinations and other verification procedures took the
claimant’s fibromyalgia outside of this self-report provision.
In Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, the court affirmed
an insurer’s denial of benefits because the claimant “fail[ed] to show that
the Committee’s decision, based on her failure to submit recent,
comprehensive medical evidence sufficient to establish the disabling nature
of her fibromyalgia, was arbitrary and capricious.” 199 The plan in question
provided that “‘Total Disability’ means . . . the inability of [the] Participant,
based upon conclusive medical evidence, to engage in any gainful
occupation for which he or she is reasonably fitted by education, training or
experience, as determined by the Plan Administrator.”200 The court found
that the claimant “fail[ed] to show that it was unreasonable for the
Committee to interpret this definition to require recent, objective evidence
of the existence of a condition.”201
Even in cases where the courts have sided with the claimant, the opinions
have noted that plan administrators could protect themselves with plan
language that excluded coverage for subjective-proof diseases such as
195. Id. at *5, *7.
196. Id. at *6.
197. Id. at *10.
198. Id.
199. Meraou v. Williams Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 221 F. App’x 696, 706 (10th
Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 698 (quoting the language of the plan) (second emphasis added).
201. Id. at 704.
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fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue syndrome. 202 Though courts have espoused
the ability of plan administrators to contract around these diseases,
Congress could rectify the corresponding detriment to claimants.203
In evaluating the restrictions and requirements in disability plans, courts
typically distinguish the evidence that supports the diagnosis and the
evidence that supports the disability. When a plan calls for objective
evidence of a diagnosis, the court may find the requirement unreasonable,
especially when confronted with a disease such fibromyalgia that has no
objective basis for diagnosis. When the plan calls for objective evidence of
disability, this inquiry may require the claimant to provide objective
evidence of the limitations that the fibromyalgia or similar disease impose
upon the claimant. Even with evidence of disability, a plan administrator
may still deny a claimant based on lack of objective diagnosis. In that case,
the denial is against public policy because the claimant cannot obtain such
evidence.
C. Subjective Proof in Other Arenas
In contrast to adjudications involving disability denials under ERISA,
subjective evidence is frequently used and credited in other judicial
proceedings. Moreover, this type of evidence can be outcome determinative
in other areas of the law.
A jury determining an amount of damages takes into account the
subjective evidence of the plaintiff. 204 A jury instruction of: “Do not take
into account plaintiff’s subjective evidence as to the amount of pain and
suffering he or she endured as a result of the injury,” would be absurd. A
jury cannot separate subjective evidence and pain and suffering, for they are
inherently intertwined.
In tort law, damages for “pain and suffering” have been a longstanding
component of litigation. 205 In Oklahoma, for a jury award for future pain
and suffering based on subjective reports, “there must be evidence by
expert witnesses that plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, will experience

202. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir.
2011) (“The plan has no exception to coverage for chronic fatigue syndrome, so CIGNA has
taken on the risk of false claims for this difficult to diagnose condition.”).
203. See infra Section IV.C.
204. See Steven Plitt & John K. Wittwer, Colossus Under Attack: The Legal Efficacy of
Computerized Evaluation of Bodily Injury Claims, 29 INS. LITIG. REP. 321, 321 (2007).
205. Id.
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such pain and suffering and that the injury is permanent.” 206 When “the
injury is ‘objective, and it is plainly apparent from the nature of the
injury . . . the jury may infer that fact from proof of that injury alone.’” 207
For example, for future pain and suffering damages due to an injury that is
reliant on subjective evidence, the plaintiff would have to show future pain
and suffering with expert evidence:
Where the injury is subjective, and of such a nature that laymen
cannot, with reasonable certainty, know whether or not there will
be future pain and suffering, then, in order to warrant an
instruction on that point, and to authorize a jury to return a
verdict for future pain and suffering, there must be offered
evidence by expert witnesses, learned in human anatomy, who
can testify, either from a personal examination or knowledge of
the history of the case, or from a hypothetical question based on
the facts, that the plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, may be
expected to experience future pain and suffering, as a result of
the injury proven. 208
In claims for pain and suffering, rewards have included recovery for
hardships such as insomnia and mental suffering. 209 These elements,
especially insomnia, are also symptoms of some diseases that result in
disability claims, such as fibromyalgia.210
Because of the inherently personal aspects of awards for “pain and
suffering,” attempts to develop a formula or otherwise quantify an amount
for a jury have failed.211 In Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., an expert informed
the jury that, based upon his calculations, “the baseline value of an average
person’s remaining 44-year life expectancy is $2.3 million.”212 He then told
them “that after adjusting the baseline value to account for the plaintiff’s
expected lifespan, the jury could calculate the plaintiff’s hedonic damages
by multiplying the percentage of the plaintiff’s disability by the adjusted
206. Edwards v. Chandler, 1957 OK 45, ¶ 5, 308 P.2d 295, 297.
207. Id.
208. Reed v. Scott, 1991 OK 113, ¶ 9, 820 P.2d 445, 449 (quoting Shawnee-Tecumseh
Traction Co. v. Griggs, 1915 OK 576, ¶ 4, 151 P. 230, 231).
209. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 2 AM. LAW OF TORTS § 8:19 (Monique C.M. Leahy, ed.
2019).
210. Morgan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 346 F.3d 1173, 1175 (8th Cir. 2003).
211. Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1998).
212. Id.
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baseline figure.”213 The court noted that “[t]here is ‘[n]o definite standard or
method of calculation . . . prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable
compensation for pain and suffering.’” 214
Hedonic damages, or loss of enjoyment of life, is not a separate damages
award in all states.215 In Oklahoma, hedonic damages “ha[ve] not yet gained
favor as a separate element of damages,” but “Oklahoma does allow for a
broad sweep of evidence to be entertained in determining future pain and
suffering.”216 The law does not require a claimant to objectively show a
pecuniary value for pain and suffering, because in many cases, it is
impossible. 217 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court questioned, “Is a person
injured in an accident to be deprived of compensation for the pain and
suffering endured because he cannot offer evidence of what the pain and
suffering were worth from a pecuniary standpoint?” 218
This rationale should cross over into claims for disability. Is a person
who makes a claim for disability due to subjective disease to be deprived of
benefits because he cannot offer objective medical proof of his disability?
Typically, claimants who are vying for disability coverage have information
in the administrative record from their treating physician supporting the
claim that they are disabled.219 Though an administrator does not have to
honor a personal doctor’s belief that the claimant is disabled and should be
entitled to benefits,220 in a personal injury claim this evidence would allow
the jury to award damages for future pain and suffering.221
IV. Legislative and Judicial Solutions
The problems inherent in current ERISA jurisprudence are not unknown
to Congress. In 2010, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing in
which they reviewed practitioners’, doctors’, and judges’ views on the
current state of ERISA and the discrepancies between the legislative intent

213. Id.
214. Id. at 575–76 (quoting Cal. Civil Jury Instruction 14.13 (8th ed. 1994)).
215. See VICKI LAWRENCE MACDOUGALL, OKLAHOMA PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 12:13
(2017) (vol. 8 in Thomson Reuters’ “Oklahoma Practice Series”).
216. Id.
217. Town of Sentinel v. Boggs, 1936 OK 620, ¶ 9, 61 P.2d 654, 656–57 (per curiam).
218. Id.
219. See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 826 (2003).
220. Id. at 825.
221. Reed v. Scott, 1991 OK 113, ¶¶ 9–11, 820 P.2d 445, 449.
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behind that act and the current experience of policy-holders.222 In calling
the hearing to order, the Senate Finance Committee Chairman
acknowledged the “loopholes in the law” that permit insurance company
“abuses.”223 The Chairman enumerated these loopholes as ERISA
preemption resulting in evidentiary restrictions 224 and the allowance of
discretionary clauses.225 One testimonial described current ERISA
jurisprudence: “Contrary to the clearly expressed legislative intent, the
courts have transformed ERISA into a shield that protects insurance
companies from having to face the consequences of unprincipled benefit
denials and other breaches of fiduciary duty.” 226
Though pain determinations produce difficulty for both plan
administrators and reviewing courts, the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) has solicited public input on its administrative consideration of
pain in disability claims. 227 The SSA aims to “remain[] aligned with
contemporary medicine and health care delivery practices.”228 This
determination to keep abreast of medical and scientific advances to provide
a fairer disability claims process should be imported into ERISA. If plan
administrators were required to evaluate subjective pain diseases in a way
current with medical and scientific practices that emphasize the availability
of clinical examinations, then unfair denials and judicial review would not
be as common or complicated. However, as the SSA’s call for notes and
comments is still so recent, any implementation of the SSA’s findings is
unlikely to occur soon.229
While a scientific solution for pain evaluation may be on the horizon,
there is no telling how long such a solution will take to find and implement
in disability claims and administrator evaluations. For now, having a
222. Do Private Long-Term Disability Policies Provide the Protection They Promise?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Hearing].
223. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.).
224. The Congressman listed the following evidentiary restrictions: “[C]laimants cannot
get jury trials, pretrial discovery, or the right to submit evidence to the court.” Id. (statement
of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.).
225. Id. (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.).
226. Id. at 5 (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi.,
Ill.).
227. Consideration of Pain in the Disability Determination Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 6449301 (proposed for comment Dec. 17, 2018).
228. Id.
229. The deadline for public comments and supporting data about pain evaluation was
due February 15, 2019. Id.
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judicial safeguard that ensures claimants are not being denied unfairly will
ensure that ERISA’s primary goal of protecting beneficiaries’ interests is
given full strength.
A. Heightened “Abuse of Discretion” Standard
A universal standard of review for appeals of ERISA denials would
allow for more clarity and consistency among ERISA appeals. 230 Though
the Supreme Court in MetLife refused to enlist a “talismanic” set of factors
to be considered by courts, a “list of nonexclusive factors” would guide
lower courts and help ERISA’s goal of creating “uniformity in the field of
employee benefits.”231 One factor that should be included in this list is
whether the denial of benefits was based on a lack of objective evidence or
tests. Even if there is not a universal list of factors that lower courts must
take into account when reviewing denials of benefits, circuits should
elucidate that a lessening of deference is warranted where a plan
administrator bases the denial upon lack of objective proof of disease.
When faced with an appeal for a denial of disability benefits for a claimant
with a subjective-proof disease, the reviewing court should heighten the
abuse of discretion standard. This solution mirrors that proposed by the
Supreme Court in Firestone for the conflict of interest the insurer has when
acting as both plan administrator and payor of benefits.
When outlining the factors for reviewing courts to consider in analyzing
a denial for benefits, the courts should consider the presentation of
subjective proof as a factor, sliding the scale against the deferential standard
usually implemented by appellate courts. 232 The benefits of a heightened
standard of review for claims that are based on subjective evidence include
better protection for claimants from discriminatory denials and improved
guidance for courts in reviewing claims of this nature. Acknowledging that
the medical community cannot objectively prove these diseases, and that
plan administrators are taking advantage of that ambiguity will ensure that
claimants are not unfairly denied. Though this solution still grants
deference to the plan administrator, allowing the fact that a claimant’s
diagnosis is based on subjective proof to lower that deference makes it
more likely that a claimant will get a full and fair review.
One major drawback of heightening the abuse of discretion standard is
the potential for judicial confusion regarding the standard of review. With
230. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 134–45.
231. Id.
232. See Weber v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2008).
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Glenn, the
Court solidified that the plan administrator’s position as both decisionmaker and payor of benefits is a conflict of interest. 233 Further, the decision
explicated that the conflict of interest is to be taken into account in ERISA
appeals.234 The circuits implemented this heightened scrutiny, with some
using a sliding scale approach and others essentially leaving the abuse of
discretion standard the same. 235 Adding one more factor to a non-exhaustive
list of considerations may create judicial confusion, as judicial ERISA
reviews have no universal template. Though circuit courts are unlikely to
reach unanimity in evaluating subjective-proof diseases, elucidating the
subjective-proof concern as a specific factor would ensure that claimants
with these diseases are not unfairly barred by a judicial framework that does
not ensure claimants have a fair chance at overturning a denial.
B. De Novo Review
The Supreme Court has been wary of instituting de novo review for
benefit claim denial appeals.236 Though the Supreme Court has not been
willing to expressly adopt a system of de novo review for denials of claim
benefits under ERISA, Congress could implement legislation establishing
this level of review to better protect claimants. 237 Such an implementation
would ensure that claimants are properly heard in court and that claimants
receive a full and fair review of the benefit denial. This change would not
only aid claimants suffering from subjective-proof diseases, but also protect
those who make claims for objectively diagnosed diseases. Instead of an
interested plan administrator, the appeal would be decided by an
uninterested third party, thus giving the claimant the best chance for a fair
decision. De novo review could also encourage expanded discovery, which
would allow claimants to present evidence outside of the administrative
record for review. Enabling courts to look at more evidence would fully
effectuate the allowance of full and fair review under ERISA.
Though appealing to claimants, de novo review of all ERISA claim
denials is unlikely because of the immense judicial expense it would
233. 554 U.S. 105, 114 (2008).
234. Id. at 117.
235. See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 114–32.
236. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115–17 (1989).
237. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 114 (“Had Congress intended such a system of review, we
believe it would not have left to the courts the development of review standards but would
have said more on the subject.”).
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require.238 It would also deny the insurer the benefit of the discretions that it
bargained for in the insurance contract.239 The increased litigation expenses
would likely be passed through to the employers using the plans, thus
decreasing the appeal of providing these benefits for employees. If plan
administrators were not allowed this discretion, the added cost for
employers might cause them to abandon their plans altogether. 240 Though
potentially more costly, the legislature drafted ERISA to provide for de
novo review, and only subsequent judicial interpretation of that Act has
given insurance companies discretion. 241
Since universal de novo review for ERISA denials is unlikely, whether
by Supreme Court ruling or legislative intervention, other, more narrow
alternatives would still protect claimants whose diseases have unknown
etiology or use subjective proof. Courts should alter the standard of review
when plan administrators deny benefits for reasons involving subjective
evidence. These decisions should be evaluated de novo, without the
deference normally given to plan administrators. Courts could review the
factual contentions and independently determine if the claimant is entitled
to disability benefits.
Even in cases where the court has overturned a denial of benefits for an
abuse of discretion, the weighing of conflicts of interest is a difficult
judicial task. 242 For example, “unlike weighing potassium bromide and
238. See Hearing, supra note 222, at 11–12 (“[B]usiness owners would be disinclined to
provide voluntary benefits if it becomes overly expensive or it exposes the business to the
threat of costly litigation.”) (statement of Paul Graham, Senior Vice President, Ins. Reg., and
Chief Actuary, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Wash., D.C.).
239. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1563 (11th Cir.
1990) (“While de novo review is an attractive avenue for controlling the exercise of
discretion contrary to the interests of the beneficiaries, the application of this strict standard
would deny Blue Cross the benefit of the bargain it made in the insurance contract.”).
240. But see Hearing, supra note 222, at 6 (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley,
DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.). DeBofsky argues that the value of providing employee
benefit plans “to recruit and retain prized employees” is outweighed by any increased cost.
Id. (statement of Mark DeBofsky, Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.). He
predicts that “it is extremely unlikely that employers would cease sponsoring benefit plans,
nor is there a legitimate fear of markedly increased costs.” Id. (statement of Mark DeBofsky,
Att’y, Daley, DeBofsky, and Bryant, Chi., Ill.).
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2014); see also Hearing, supra note 222, at 8 (“The
clear language of ERISA recognizes nothing less than a trial on the merits.”) (statement by
Hon. William M. Acker, Jr., Senior U.S. Dist. Court Judge, N.D. Ala., Birmingham, Ala.).
242. See Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir.
2011).
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potassium ferricyanide in a traditional darkroom, [a court’s] ‘weighing’ is
done without a scale, without the little brass weights, and without a
substance to weigh that has any weighable mass.”243 This difficulty would
be ameliorated by adjusting the standard of review when plan
administrators deny a claim due to a lack of objective evidence. Instead of
wading into the bog of evaluating conflicts of interest, the court could
simply review the underlying claim de novo and determine if the claimant
is entitled to disability benefits.
Currently, judicial review is limited to review of the administrative
record because of the discretion granted to plan administrators. This scope
limitation means that the claimant is not able to present further evidence to
the court to attempt to prove disability or show that the plan administrator
wrongfully denied disability benefits. Though de novo review does not
automatically guarantee the claimant’s ability to provide further evidence,
an alteration to the current judicial process to allow evidence outside of the
administrative record could ensure that the policy goals of ERISA are
upheld. If a reviewing court can examine this evidence de novo and
determine if the claimant is entitled to benefits, then there is the greatest
surety of “full and fair” review, which is guaranteed under ERISA. Further,
when a plan administrator denies a claim for disability because the claimant
brings forth subjective evidence, the courts should consider the denial an
automatic abuse of discretion. Courts should require that a plan
administrator have more reason to deny a claimant than just the fact that she
brings forward only subjective evidence. 244
Though the Supreme Court has been reluctant to permit de novo review
in these types of claims, such an approach would ensure that claimants
receive a full and fair review. Because plan administrators act under a
conflict of interest, diseases evidenced by subjective proof present an easy
and mildly persuasive justification for denying claims. Therefore, courts
should pursue heightened standards of review in order to give
disadvantaged, pain-filled claimants the protection they need.

243. Id.
244. See id. at 676 (finding plan administrator’s denial was unreasonable because “the
plan administrator demanded objective tests to establish the existence of a condition for
which there are not objective tests” among other factors).
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C. Disallowance of “Self-Report” Clauses in Long-Term Disability Plans
Today, many private LTD plans limit benefits for diseases that rely on
subjective-proof or self-reported symptoms.245 For example, a plan may
state that plan benefits will be terminated after twenty-four months for
diseases “not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical examinations
standardly accepted in the practice of medicine.” 246 This plan language is
hard to reconcile with the current state of medicine regarding subjectiveproof diseases. 247 With many very real, very debilitating diseases, there are
not objective medical tests available to prove the existence of some
conditions. When an LTD plan includes a clause that explicitly denies
benefits to a class of claimants with disabling diseases that are unprovable,
the plan impedes the basic purpose of ERISA.
Requiring objective proof of the etiology of a disease or discontinuing
benefits because a claimant’s complaints are self-reported fails to provide
adequate protection. There are medical evaluations that can provide
evidence of disability where a disease is not objectively measurable. 248
With the availability of these tests to determine whether a disease renders a
claimant disabled, there is not a need for objective proof of the disease. If
Congress disallowed the use of self-report provisions, then claimants with
subjective-proof diseases would have the same benefits and review process
as other more objectively verifiable diseases. If denied, the proper district
court could then review the claim without the bias against self-reported
symptoms.
Since the Supreme Court has found that trust law largely governs
ERISA, plan administrators are acting as fiduciaries.249 As such, they must
“discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
[plan] participants and beneficiaries.”250 This duty is hard to reconcile with
245. See, e.g., Weitzenkamp v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 500 F. App’x 506, 507 (7th
Cir. 2013); Cox v. Allin Corp. Plan, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The plan at
issue in Weitzenkamp contained a clause that ceased benefits after two years for disabilities
“which are primarily based on self-reported symptoms.” Weitzenkamp, 500 F. App’x at 507
(quoting language of the plan). The plan defined self-reported symptoms as “those that ‘are
not verifiable using tests, procedures or clinical examinations.’” Id. (quoting the language of
the plan).
246. Cox, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 (quoting the language of the plan).
247. See supra Part III.
248. See Liebel v. AETNA Life Ins. Co., 595 F. App’x 755, 759–61 (10th Cir. 2014).
249. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 (1989).
250. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).
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contract language that denies relief for a certain class of diseases. If
Congress required disability plans to cover self-reported symptoms, then an
entire class of disability claimants would be better able to obtain the full
and fair review that ERISA promises.
Conclusion
Diseases evidenced by subjective proof are inherently impossible to
prove objectively, and therefore are difficult to address on judicial review.
The standard of review that courts employ in these appeals is that of “abuse
of discretion,” which is heightened if there is a conflict of interest, which
there often is. This conflict of interest arises because the insurer is both the
administrator of the plan and the payor of benefits if the claimant succeeds
in their application. Even with a heightened “abuse of discretion” standard,
claimants whose diseases are evidenced by subjective proof are not
guaranteed a full and fair review of their claims. Plan administrators may
simply deny claims and then argue that the denial was justified due to a lack
of objective evidence on appeal. While they are not always successful, with
today’s judicial scheme, it is more likely than not that the plan
administrator’s denial will be upheld.
Increasingly, insurance plan language discriminates against claimants
with subjective-proof diseases. “Self-Report” clauses and those that deny
any form of relief for these illnesses are against public policy and should be
disallowed by federal legislation. To provide that an employee must have
objective evidence of his disease contradicts modern medicine’s recognition
of many debilitating diseases that do not have medical tests for diagnosis. If
an employee is provided coverage by his employer or buys long-term
disability coverage independently, plan administrators should not deny his
claim because his plan has unfairly excluded his disease. These self-report
clauses are against public policy and Congress should mandate an exclusion
from long-term disability plans covered under ERISA. ERISA’s goal to
protect the rights of employees goes against the coverage provided in many
of these plans, and these contradictions should not be allowed.
By altering the standard of review or disallowing clauses biased against
subjective-proof diseases, a claimant’s right to full and fair review will be
ensured. Just because objective tests do not evidence these diseases does
not mean they are any less disabling. Ensuring a claimant receives full and
fair review guarantees that the employee’s rights are upheld and plan
administrators do not unfairly deny their claims.
Courtney D. Keeling
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